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Abstract—The application of Mission Critical Machine Type
Communication (MC-MTC) in wireless systems is currently a
hot research topic. Wireless systems are considered to provide
numerous advantages over wired systems in e.g. industrial appli-
cations such as closed loop control. However, due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless channel, such systems are prone to a wide
range of cyber attacks. These range from passive eavesdropping
attacks to active attacks like data manipulation or masquerade
attacks. Therefore it is necessary to provide reliable and efficient
security mechanisms. Some of the most important security issues
in such a system are to ensure integrity as well as authenticity of
exchanged messages over the air between communicating devices.
In the present work, an approach on how to achieve this goal in
MC-MTC systems based on Physical Layer Security (PHYSEC)
is presented. A new method that clusters channel estimates of
different transmitters based on a Gaussian Mixture Model is
applied for that purpose. Further, an experimental proof-of-
concept evaluation is given and we compare the performance of
our approach with a mean square error based detection method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a new trend in the area of wireless systems is
the operation of MC-MTC as for instance closed loop control
applications. These have much higher requirements regard-
ing reliability, availability and especially latency compared
to common applications such as media streaming or web
browsing over IEEE 802.11 based wireless systems or today’s
cellular systems. Another important requirement in the area
of MC-MTC is the fact that secure transmission of data has
to be taken into account. Due to the sensitive information
transmitted in e. g. industrial or automotive scenarios, it is
necessary to guarantee a high degree of information security.
Especially authenticity as well as integrity of the transmitted
data has to be ensured to prohibit a wide range of possible
active cyber attacks. For this purpose identification and au-
thentication of received messages is necessary in order to be
sure of the originator of that data before it is consumed and
processed by the respective application.
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Although there are conventional cryptography techniques to
ensure authenticity as well as integrity of message payload,
these require a lot of resources. Especially they lead to
increase in message size due to the fact that, for example
message authentication codes (MAC) which are used in IEEE
802.15.4 based systems, add a kind of check sum to the actual
message payload. In IEEE 802.15.4 based systems either a 4,
8 or 16 Byte MAC is added to the respective payload. The
recommendation of the IETF is to either use a CMAC, e. g.
based on AES-128 block cipher, or a HMAC which is based
on a cryptographic hash function. For AES-128 based CMAC
a maximum shortening to 64 Bit is recommended, while for
HMAC a minimum MAC size of 80 Bit is recommended.
If we now assume that the payload of a MC-MTC packet
has a length of 32 Byte (the dimension of this assumption is
e.g. confirmed by [1]), then the payload overhead regarding
the MAC size for AES-128 CMAC of 8 Byte would be
already 20%. This means that a latency overhead of at least
20% is added by only applying means to guarantee message
authenticity and integrity. Another important issue is, that
key based schemes such as message authentication codes are
only able to protect the message payload from the mentioned
attacks. An attacker is still able to perform attacks such as
address spoofing, or even worse, record a message and replay
it after a while. Due to these drawbacks, another idea is to
check for authenticity of a message at a lower level by taking
physical properties of the radio link signal in time domain,
as well as in spatial domain into account. In this work, a
keyless approach for this based on estimating the wireless
channel at link level is presented. As mentioned, MC-MTC and
closed loop control applications are considered here, which in
combination seems to be a perfect case for our approach, as we
can assume that frequent and periodic data transmissions and
with this channel estimation at the same rate is carried out. For
experimental evaluation, we consider an OFDM system and
based on the respective frequency domain channel estimations,
we decide from which source a received data packet was
transmitted.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. In section
II we give a short overview on related work with respect to
previous considered approaches and in section III we describe
the system model. Our approach of Gaussian Mixture Model
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based clustering is presented in section IV. In section V we
present the results of our work and section VI finally concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several approaches on exploiting the wireless channel for
security purposes, also known as PHYSEC, have been inves-
tigated recently. In [2] a good overview on this topic is given.
While many works have focused on extracting secret keys
between two communicating devices, such as [3], [4], [5],
the focus of our work is on guaranteeing secure transmission
with respect to authenticity of data packets from one device to
another. One of the first works considering that idea has been
for example [6], where an approach based on simulation of the
wireless channel and hypothesis testing is presented for static
scenarios and is later in [7] extended to time-variant scenarios.
In [8], two approaches based on machine learning, Support
Vector Machine and Linear Fisher Discriminant Analysis, are
presented. The approach considered in [9] is similar to our
approach, as they propose a CSI-based authentication method
for a single carrier system. The second approach considered
in [9] is whiteness of residuals testing. In [10] an RSS-based
approach for body area networks is presented. The work in
[11] considers a multilayer approach based on OFDM to
guarantee authentication of TCP packets. A Gaussian Mixture
Model based technique in combination with exploitation of the
channel responses for different antenna modes is considered
in [12].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we describe the system model and the
attacker model including the mentioned active attacks. Further,
the channel model is introduced and we explain how to exploit
PHYSEC techniques, actually frequent channel estimation, in
order to overcome these attack scenarios.
A. Attacker model
We consider two users, Alice and Bob, who want to
exchange authenticated messages with each other. For this
work we define that Bob is the legal transmit node who wishes
to send some sensitive information to the legal receiver node
Alice. Alice must make sure that Bob is the true transmitter
of these messages. A third party Eve tries to masquerade as
Bob and sends messages to Alice as well (see Fig. 1). A
typical scenario for an attacker Eve is that he is at a spatially
different location compared to Bob and uses advanced
equipment such as directed antennas and high sensitivity
receivers to maximize his range to his benefit. We also
assume perfect knowledge of the underlying communication
protocol at Eve to run active attacks such as masquerade
attacks, replay attacks or address spoofing attacks. It is not
assumed that Eve is gaining physical access to Alice or Bob
to accomplish invasive attacks such as hardware modification.
Further, other active attacks such as Denial-of-Service attacks
due to jamming are not considered as well. It is assumed,
that the legal communicating participants Bob and Alice have
Fig. 1: System and Attacker Model
already carried out initial user authentication to each other
and have set up trust in a secure way. Attacks on the initial
authentication stage are not considered. The goal is now to
authenticate the messages transmitted from Bob to Alice in a
secure way, which as well takes the requirements of MC-MTC
into account, especially minimization of transmission latency.
B. Channel model and channel estimation
Due to the mentioned drawbacks of message authenticity
checking based on conventional cryptography, such as message
authentication codes, and the special requirements of MC-
MTC, a more promising approach is to use characteristics of
the wireless channel and the physical layer to decide about the
origin of a received message. In our work, we focus on channel
estimations which are computed at the receiver in any OFDM
based system to perform for example channel equalization. In
contrast to PHYSEC techniques such as secret key generation,
which are based on the assumption that there is a lot of
temporal variation in the wireless channel, our approach relies
on the fact that the wireless channel does not vary significantly
during subsequent channel measurements. However, the same
idea that yields for both is to make use of the advantage of
the fast spatial decorrelation property of wireless channels.
For our work in particular, this means, that e.g. Alice receives
messages from the legal transmit node Bob and estimates the
actual channel Hˆ as
H = [|h1|, . . . , |hM |] (1)
with |hl| being the magnitude of the gain of the l-th subcarrier
and l = 1, . . . ,M . Due to the receiver noise figure or thermal
noise, channel estimation is not perfect, which means that
errors occur (H 6= Hˆ). These influences can be modelled as
a gaussian random variable N with zero mean and variance
σ2N. The transmit signal X will be received as
Y = Hˆ ·X + N (2)
and consequently the channel is estimated as
H = Hˆ +
N
X
. (3)
The idea is now that if an attacker Eve tries to transmit
messages masqueraded as Bob, the channel measured by
Alice is another one compared to the channel regarding to
Bob. Basically, if we denote the channel estimates with HAB
and HAE taken due to Bob and Eve respectively, this yields
HAE 6= HAB. Due to the distance dBE between the attacker
node Eve and the legal transmitter node Bob (which needs to
be more than the wavelength of the transmitted signal), Eve
is not able to masquerade without further effort due to the
mentioned fast spatial decorrelation property of the channel.
We can now use the estimated channel conditions by Alice to
identify the originator of the respective message by means of
clustering based on a Gaussian Mixture Model.
IV. GAUSSIAN MIXTURE MODEL FOR PHYSEC BASED
AUTHENTICATION
This section deals with Gaussian Mixture Models which are
used to cluster the channel estimates in combination with the
EM algorithm. The result of this process is then used to make
a decision about the corresponding transmitter of received data
packets.
A. Gaussian Mixture Model
A mixture of Gaussians
f(x) =
K∑
k=1
pikN (x|µk,Σk) (4)
is consisting of K Gaussian densities fk(x) = N (x|µk,Σk)
which each have a mean µk and a covariance matrix Σk.
The mixtures are weighted by mixing coefficients pi =
{pi1, . . . , piK} which are normalized yielding
K∑
k=1
pik = 1. (5)
These mixing coefficients further fulfill the property to be
probabilities, technically they are prior probabilities. The goal
is now to calculate the posterior probability
p
(j)
i,k =
pi
(j)
k N (xi|µ(j)k ,Σ(j)k )∑K
k=1 pi
(j)
k N (xi|µ(j)k ,Σ(j)k )
(6)
of each new set of data points xi with i = 1, . . . , N , i. e. each
new channel estimate, which denotes the likelihood of this data
belonging to a certain component of the mixture. The posterior
probability is updated during the expectation step of the EM
algorithm. In the maximization step the parameter values are
updated. The weighting coefficients are calculated as
pi
(j+1)
k =
∑N
i=1 p
(j)
i,k
N
, (7)
whereas the updated mean and covariance values are calcu-
lated as
µ
(j+1)
k =
∑N
i=1 p
(j)
i,kxi∑N
i=1 p
(j)
i,k
(8)
and
Σ
(j+1)
k =
∑N
i=1 p
(j)
i,k(xi − µ(j)k )(xi − µ(j)k )T∑N
i=1 p
(j)
i,k
(9)
for the j-th iteration of the EM algorithm respectively.
B. Physical Layer Authentication based on Clustering
To make a decision on received data packets from any
transmitter, we need to determine how likely it is that a new set
of data belongs to one of the gaussian mixture components.
In our case we have K = 2 mixture components, one for
Bob and one for Eve each. If the channel estimate fits to
the cluster modeling Bob, then Alice will assume that Bob is
the true transmitter. She further can use this new information
to update the gaussian mixture model, which improves the
accuracy of it. Due to temporal variations, if e.g. one or more
users have some degree of mobility, it is even necessary to
continuously update the model online after a certain time to
catch up with these variations. If the likelihood of belonging to
Bobs cluster of a new set of data is below a certain threshold,
then Alice assumes that it was introduced by Eve. In order
to build an initial model and help Alice to identify who is
belonging to which cluster, Bob needs to send some training
messages to Alice. Alice will then use the cluster component
with the most data sets from this training phase as the cluster
belonging to Bob. To now attack our system, we assume that
a message is either send to Alice by Bob or Eve by a given
probability respectively. The probability of Eve transmitting
(masqueraded as Bob) is also known as the attack intensity
(AI). For each message, we decide about the originator based
on the current model. After N received messages, the model
is updated based on these N new data sets and the current
GMM properties (pi,µ,Σ)m (m denotes the index of the
blocks of data sets) yielding the new model (pi,µ,Σ)m+1.
By doing this, the historical data that was used to build the
model initially does not need to be stored. As a result of this,
we get two performance parameters, the detection probability
PD and the false alarm rate PFA.
PD = pi,B((piB ,µB ,ΣB)m|Hm,i due to Eve) < th (10)
denotes the probability of detecting Eve as the transmitter
of the i-th message of the m-th set of messages under the
condition that it was truly sent by Eve and
PFA = pi,B((piB ,µB ,ΣB)m|Hm,i due to Bob) < th (11)
the probability of detecting Eve as transmitter of that message
under the condition that it was truly sent by Bob.
V. RESULTS
In this section we describe our setup for the experimental
evaluation and show the final results of our work.
Fig. 2: Environment with different Alice and Bob/Eve posi-
tions
A. Experimental setup
To evaluate our concepts, we use USRP N210 SDR plat-
forms from Ettus Research with SBX daughterboards. We use
GNURadio OFDM transmitter and receiver blocks to process
data packets and perform channel estimation on each received
data packet. A setup with an FFT size of 64 is considered and
48 active subcarriers. The cyclic prefix length is 16 samples
at a baseband sample rate of 3.125 MSps, whereas the carrier
frequency is 2.45 GHz. For each received data packet, the
initial channel taps are calculated based on the known Schmidl
and Cox preamble [13] which is also used to calculate the
frequency offset at the receiver (actually this preamble consists
of two OFDM symbols). In each message, this preamble is
followed by 37 data symbols yielding a time resolution of
998.4 µs for the channel estimations. As a first step, we
consider a static setup where all participants do not move
during transmitting and receiving. The environment is a mixed
office/lab area with a lot of objects and metal walls. Due to
this we assume at least some amount of multipath propagation
existing and with this frequency selective channels. We record
data for several different locations of Bob and Eve respectively,
yielding multiple different constellations of Alice/Bob and
Alice/Eve pairs as shown in Fig. 2.
B. Performance of GMM based Clustering
In order to evaluate the performance of the GMM based
clustering, the detection probability PD as well as the false
alarm rate PFA are considered and plotted in form of a ROC
curve, where each data point is a pair of PD and PFA values at
a certain threshold. We considered a block size of N = 1000
data sets in order to update our GMM and use one block for
training the model and 99 data blocks in order to test it. The
attack intensity is kept at 50%. Fig. 3a shows the performance
of our GMM based method compared to the simpler method
of mean square error (MSE) based detection considered in
[14] for the case, that all 48 active carriers are used for the
detection. It can be seen that the GMM method outperforms
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Fig. 3: ROC curves for the GMM and MSE method
the MSE based method. While the detection rate of the MSE
method is 81.03% at a false alarm rate of 5.83%, the detection
rate of the GMM based method is 99.97% (if cases of ill-
conditioned covariance matrices are avoided) at the same false
alarm rate. Even at a false alarm rate of 0.1%, the GMM
method has a detection rate of 99.93%.
Fig. 4 shows the influence of the accuracy of the channel
estimation in form of different amounts of equally spaced
estimated points in frequency domain, ranging from M = 48
(each active data carrier considered) to M = 3 (every 16-
th active data carrier considered). In Fig. 4a, the respective
ROC curves are shown in linear scale and Fig. 4b shows them
in logarithmic scale. In case of M = 3, the detection rate
is 97.97% at a false alarm rate of 1%, while in case of the
channel estimation with 48 estimated bins, the detection rate
is at 99.98% at the same false alarm rate. For other values of
M , the detection rate is at 99.77%, 99.93% and 99.96% for
M = 6, M = 12 and M = 24 respectively.
C. Discussion of Results
The experimental evaluation of our method shows, that the
performance of our GMM based clustering method increases
as the feature space, which is in our case the number of
estimated subcarrier per message M , also increases. If a false
alarm rate of 1% is considered, the performance gain in case
of M = 48 is 2.05% compared to M = 3. Additionally,
we proved that the GMM method performs better than the
MSE detection method. Here, in case of a false alarm rate of
5.83%, the performance gain of the GMM over MSE method
is 23.37%.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our proposed method of taking characteristics of the phys-
ical layer into account in order to identify and authenticate
transmitters of MC-MTC messages seems to be a promising
technique in order to achieve that goal in a very efficient way.
The combination of both, MC-MTC and clustering of channel
estimates is essential considering system efficiency, as both
rely on frequent transmission of data packets. We can reuse
channel estimations and make decisions on the authenticity of
received data packets with little effort. Though the maximum
achieved detection rate is high at 99.98%, the method needs
still to be improved in order to get more reliable decisions. To
gain robustness due to errors in channel estimations induced
by noise, approaches such as in [15] might be suited in
order to reduce this effect based on pre-processing of channel
estimates. Another issue that needs to be investigated is the
amount of training data used in order to initialize the model, as
well as the assumed attack intensity. Additionally we also want
to focus on a mobile setup with little to moderate velocities in
order to verify, that the method also works well under these
conditions.
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